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THE JURISDICTION OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT
Eric M. Fraser, David K. Kessler, Matthew J.B. Lawrence
& Stephen A. Calhoun*
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit is unique among
federal courts, well known for an unusual caseload that is disproportionally weighted toward administrative law. What explains that unusual
caseload? This Article explores that question. We identify several factors that “push” some types of cases away from the Circuit and several
factors that “pull” other cases to it. We give particular focus to the
jurisdictional provisions of federal statutes, which reveal congressional
intent about the types of actions over which the D.C. Circuit should have
special jurisdiction. Through a comprehensive examination of the U.S.
Code, we identify several trends. First, the Congress is more likely to
give the D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over the review of administrative rulemaking than over the review of agency decisions imposing a
penalty. Second, the Congress is more likely to give the D.C. Circuit
exclusive jurisdiction over the review of independent agency actions than
over the review of executive agency actions. Finally, the Congress tends
to grant the D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over matters that are
likely to have a national effect. In sum, we explore what makes this court
unique, from its history to its modern docket and jurisdiction.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, commonly referred
to as the D.C. Circuit, has a reputation as a unique federal court. Created
separately from the other circuit courts, the D.C. Circuit remains today a
special creature of the United States Congress. For example, in the
course of a characteristically contentious battle over the nomination of a
judge to the court, then-Senator Barack Obama repeated the accepted
wisdom that the D.C. Circuit is “a special court” that tackles a disproportionate share of thorny administrative and regulatory cases affecting a
wide range of important national public policy issues.1 Not surprisingly,
in light of this perception, scholarly commentary has paid particular attention to the D.C. Circuit.2
In this Article we offer a new take on the jurisdiction of the D.C.
Circuit. It is old news that the D.C. Circuit hears proportionately more
cases involving administrative law than do the other circuit courts.3 We
dig under that statistic to paint a richer picture of how and why the D.C.
Circuit’s jurisdiction and caseload are unique. We do this by investigating not what members of the Congress say about the D.C. Circuit during
confirmation battles, but rather how they treat the D.C. Circuit when they
legislate.
1 Barack Obama, Nomination of Justice Janice Rogers Brown Remarks (June 8, 2005),
available at http://obamaspeeches.com/021-Nomination-of-Justice-Janice-Rogers-BrownObama-Speech.htm.
2 See, e.g., John G. Roberts, Jr., Lecture, What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A
Historical View, 92 VA. L. REV. 375, 376 (2006) (noting that one-third of D.C. Circuit appeals
are from agency decisions); Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National Court, 48 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 159, 159 (1993) (discussing the bipartisan tradition of nationwide recruitment to the
D.C. Circuit and how this tradition has yielded some of the best American judges); Patricia M.
Wald, Lecture, Life on the District of Columbia Circuit: Literally and Figuratively Halfway
Between the Capitol and the White House, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1987) (noting that the
D.C. Circuit receives the majority of “political” cases).
3 Although the percentage of administrative law cases nationwide has declined somewhat in recent years, petitions for review of administrative decisions filed in the D.C. Circuit
have increased from twenty-eight percent of the national total in 1986 to a high of thirty-eight
percent in 2007 and thirty-six percent in 2010. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Remarks, Remarks Upon
Receiving the Lifetime Service Award of the Georgetown Federalist Society Chapter, 10 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2–3 (2012).
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This Article is the first to examine every provision of the U.S. Code
that specifically references the D.C. Circuit. Our analysis indicates that
the Congress has indeed paid special attention to the D.C. Circuit and
that, when viewed systematically, the Congress’s choices regarding when
and how to give the Circuit special treatment reveal underlying patterns.
We found that the D.C. Circuit has special jurisdiction not only over
certain substantive areas of the law, notably those areas involving “national subjects,” such as immigration and foreign relations, but also over
controversies that are more likely than others to have a “national effect.”4
As to the latter point, the Congress is more likely to make the D.C. Circuit’s jurisdiction exlusive when the agency action at issue is a rulemaking. In contrast, the Congress is more likely to make the D.C. Circuit’s
jurisdiction parallel when the agency action imposes a fine or other
penalty.5
The decisions by the Congress to carve out certain areas of federal
law as the special preserve of the D.C. Circuit and the infrequency with
which the Supreme Court considers, let alone reverses, the Circuit’s decisions combine to give the court the final say—and the only appellate
say—over numerous laws and rules affecting the entire nation. Understanding the Congress’s patterns in assigning special jurisdiction to the
Circuit is an important step toward understanding the policy tradeoffs at
play. These patterns can also help us understand whether new administrative laws should grant the D.C. Circuit a special role or take that special role away.6
We begin this Article by briefly discussing the history of the District of Columbia’s federal courts and looking for clues about the historical and modern jurisdictional bounds of the federal judiciary. This
historical overview emphasizes the role the Congress has played in treating the D.C. Circuit differently from other circuits.7 Second, we provide
a rich, descriptive picture of the D.C. Circuit’s modern docket that includes statistics about the types of cases the court hears, how its caseload
compares to that of other circuits, and the manner in which it resolves
these cases.8 Third, we discuss the two main drivers of the D.C. Circuit’s unique docket: primarily demographic “push” factors, which prevent the D.C. Circuit from hearing many of the bread and butter cases
forming the diet of the other circuits, and predominantly statutory “pull”
factors, which attract a disproportionate number of other kinds of federal
cases to the Circuit.9 Those pull factors reflect both the Congress’s deci4
5
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sion to grant the D.C. Circuit either exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction over a large number of administrative petitions and the choices made
by private litigants to bring their cases to the D.C. Circuit.10 Fourth, we
suggest some reasons why the Congress may have opted to confer special jurisdiction on the D.C. Circuit and conduct an examination of the
statutes in the U.S. Code granting exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction
to the D.C. Circuit.11
I.

BACKGROUND

Law professor and constitutional law scholar Thomas Baker once
noted that “[a]ny study of the federal courts or their jurisdiction must be
informed by some sense of history.” 12 Because our examination of the
D.C. Circuit is no exception, a brief history of the D.C. Circuit will help
explain some of its unique features and illustrate that the D.C. Circuit has
long been a special creature of the Congress, treated differently than
other circuit courts.13
A. Formation and History of the D.C. Circuit
In late February of 1801, two weeks after the Judiciary Act of 1801
established several other circuit courts,14 the Congress created the Circuit
Court of the District of Columbia.15 That quirk of creation saved the
court from destruction the following year when the Judiciary Act was
repealed, thus abolishing the circuit courts and judgeships it had
created.16
The D.C. Circuit’s jurisdiction was unusual from the very beginning. It not only had “all the jurisdiction” vested in the other newly
created circuit courts,17 but also inherited general jurisdiction from state
courts in Virginia and Maryland over what is now known as the District
of Columbia, a region which, at the time, included the incorporated cities
10

See discussion infra Part III.B.
See discussion infra Part IV.
12 Thomas E. Baker, A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 4
(2d ed. 2009).
13 See, e.g., Obama, supra note 1 (noting that the D.C. Circuit is “a special court” that
tackles a disproportionate share of administrative and regulatory cases affecting a wide range
of important national public policy issues).
14 Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, §6, 2 Stat. 89, 89–90 (also known as the Midnight Judges
Act) (repealed 1802).
15 Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 3, 2 Stat. 103, 105–06 (repealed 1863).
16 For speculation as to why the court did not suffer the same fate, see Roberts, supra
note 2, at 377–80.
17 Id. at 378–79.
11
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of Alexandria, Georgetown, and Washington.18 This dual jurisdiction
over federal and local issues led to some peculiar cases, including United
States ex rel. Stokes v. Kendall, the first case successfully to issue a writ
of mandamus to a federal official.19 Before Kendall, the Supreme Court
had held that federal circuit courts lacked the authority to issue a writ20
and state courts lacked the authority to issue a writ against a federal official.21 Together these decisions seemed to foreclose the possibility of
any writ against a federal official. Yet the D.C. Circuit asserted that it
could do what no other court could. Armed with the powers of a Maryland state court to issue a writ and of a federal circuit court to exercise
jurisdiction over a federal official, the D.C. Circuit issued the writ.22 The
Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the writ,23 leaving the D.C. Circuit as the only court with the power to issue such a writ for more than a
hundred years.24
Although the D.C. Circuit retained its dual jurisdiction from 1801 to
1970, the names and structures of the District’s courts changed several
times over that period. For the thirty years between 1863 and 1893, the
D.C. Circuit was called the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.25
That court, expressly created with “general jurisdiction,” combined the
powers of the previous circuit court, district court, and criminal court of
the District. 26 Any single judge (called justices at the time) could hold
district or criminal court.27
By 1893, the District’s courts finally had the structure, but not the
names, of the present federal Article III courts: a district court, a circuit
court, and the constitutionally required Supreme Court of the United
States. Dual jurisdiction remained during this period. In that year the
Congress created a new court, the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia, to hear appeals from the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia.28 In 1934 the name of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia changed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
18 See United States ex rel. Stokes v. Kendall, 26 F. Cas. 702, 706–07 (C.C.D.C. 1837);
JEFFREY BRANDON MORRIS, CALMLY TO POISE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE
COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 6 (2001).
19 MORRIS, supra note 18, at 25.
20 M’Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504, 505 (1813).
21 M’Clung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 599 (1821).
22 See Kendall, 26 F. Cas. at 706–07.
23 Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 524 (1838).
24 In 1962 the Mandamus and Venue Act extended the power to federal district courts.
See Act of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1361, 1391(e) (2006)).
25 See MORRIS, supra note 18, at 34–38; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 91 § 1, 12 Stat.
762, 763.
26 See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 91, § 1, 12 Stat. 762, 763.
27 Id.
28 See Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, § 9, 27 Stat. 434, 436.
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of Columbia.29 In 1948 the court’s name changed to its present name,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
and the circuit “justices” came to be called “judges.”30 The District’s
other courts also changed in structure and name several times during the
same time period.31
It was not until 1970 that the Congress finally split the District’s
courts and assigned matters traditionally handled by state courts to one
set, and matters traditionally handled by federal courts to the other. After
the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of
July 29, 1970, the District Court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, both of which were created under Article III of the Constitution,
retained the federal jurisdiction of other Article III courts.32 The Act
also created two new courts: the Superior Court (a trial court) and the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals (an appellate court).33 These
courts, created under Article I of the Constitution, have local jurisdiction
similar to that of state courts.
B. Potpourri
The D.C. Circuit has received special attention from the Congress
over the last two centuries in a number of smaller, yet no less interesting
ways. For example, the D.C. Circuit enjoys a special statutory provision
giving its judges—but not those of the other circuits—borrowing privileges from the Library of Congress.34 Also unique among the courts of
appeals, the D.C. Circuit has its own case reporter.35
The D.C. Circuit’s composition also reflects its status as a national
court and the special attention it receives from the Congress. With no
local senators to block nominations or to require local nominees, a president may nominate someone from any part of the country to serve on the
Circuit.36 This flexibility is codified as follows: “Except in the District
of Columbia, each circuit judge shall be a resident of the circuit for
29

See Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 426, 48 Stat. 926.
See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 41, 62 Stat. 86.
31 See MORRIS, supra note 18, at 60–61.
32 See District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, 91 Pub.
L. No. 358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970).
33 Id.
34 2 U.S.C. § 137c (2006) (“The chief judge and associate judges of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the chief judge and associate judges of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia are authorized to use and take books
from the Library of Congress in the same manner and subject to the same regulations as
justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.”).
35 The first volume of this reporter, which is still published today, emerged in 1893 when
the newly created Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia heard its first case, Bush v.
District of Columbia. See generally Bush v. District of Columbia, 1 App. D.C. 1 (D.C. Cir.
1893).
36 See Roberts, supra note 2, at 385.
30
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which appointed at the time of his appointment and thereafter while in
active service.” 37 Indeed, every president since Franklin Delano
Roosevelt has nominated someone from outside the District of Columbia
to serve on the D.C. Circuit.38 Interestingly, some of those nominees
were rejected as candidates for their home circuits before being successfully confirmed to the D.C. Circuit.39 Although the D.C. Bar has repeatedly tried to encourage the nomination of local lawyers, the practice of
pulling nominees from a nationwide pool continues.40 In addition, the
D.C. Circuit often serves as a way station for judges whom presidents
would like to make Justices; no other circuit has sent more judges to the
Supreme Court than the D.C. Circuit.41 For example, four Supreme
Court Justices were appointed after serving on the D.C. Circuit for five
or fewer years.42
II.

A DIFFERENT DOCKET

One of the most significant differences between the D.C. Circuit
and the other circuit courts is the mix of cases the D.C. Circuit courts
hears. More than 30% of filings in the D.C. Circuit are administrative
appeals, compared to 16% nationwide. Moreover, many of the administrative filings in the other circuits involve appeals, such as those arising
from the Social Security Administration, that do not typically require the
resolution of complex issues of administrative law. The differences between the D.C. Circuit and other circuits are even more pronounced in
civil suits involving the federal government. Those cases include, for
example, suits against administrative agencies that are not classified as
administrative appeals, such as constitutional challenges to federal pro37

28 U.S.C. § 44(c) (2006).
See Tobias, supra note 2, at 159. Also, some of the out-of-state nominees had experience serving in the federal government, an attribute which may be viewed as being particularly
helpful for serving on the D.C. Circuit in Washington. See also Susan Bloch & Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200th Anniversary of the Federal Courts of the District of Columbia, 90 GEO. L.J. 549, 563 (2002) (“While the district court judges come primarily from the
D.C. area, court of appeals judges continue to be drawn from a nationwide pool.”).
39 See Tobias, supra note 2, at 165.
40 See generally id.
41 See Bloch & Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 564 (“[M]ore Supreme Court Justices have
come from the D.C. Circuit than from any other federal circuit court.”).
42 Chief Justice John Roberts was appointed to the D.C. Circuit in 2003 and to the Supreme Court in 2005. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court,
SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Aug.
13, 2013). Associate Justice Clarence Thomas joined the Supreme Court in 1991 after being
appointed to the D.C. Circuit in 1990. Id. Associate Justice Antonin Scalia was appointed to
the D.C. Circuit in 1982 and to the Supreme Court in 1986. Id. Finally, Associate Justice
Wiley Rutledge was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1943 after being appointed to the D.C.
Circuit in 1939. William B. Rutledge, 1943-1949, SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY,
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-court/associate-justices/wiley-rutledge1943-1949/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
38
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grams.43 The D.C. Circuit hears proportionally four times as many of
those suits as the overall national rate.44 In total, those administrative
and civil suits involving the federal government comprise nearly 50% of
the D.C. Circuit’s docket, compared to the nationwide average of 20%.45
The D.C. Circuit is also an outlier in the areas of criminal cases and
prisoner petitions. Criminal cases occupy less than 10% of its docket, or
just over a third of the national rate.46 Although prisoner petitions
against state and local governments are a significant fraction of the
caseload of other federal courts of appeal, the D.C. Circuit hears almost
none.47 Yet, the D.C Circuit hears more than double the proportional
number of prisoner petitions against the federal government.
The differences continue in ordinary private civil cases and bankruptcy cases. For example, the fraction of the court’s docket comprising
private civil cases is half the national rate. The difference is even more
pronounced for bankruptcy appeals, which typically number in the single
digits per year in the D.C. Circuit.
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FIGURE 1: APPEALS COMMENCED48
43 E.g., In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (constitutional challenge to operation of United States Navy Chaplain Corps).
44 Infra Figure 1.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Table B-1. U.S. Courts of Appeals—Appeals Commenced, Terminated, and Pending,
by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2009, U.S. COURTS, http://www
.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2009/dec09/B01Dec
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The difference between the cases handled by the D.C. Circuit and
those heard in the other circuits may help account for other statistical
differences such as, for example, the frequency at which the D.C. Circuit
hears argument. The D.C. Circuit hears oral arguments in 44% of the
cases it decides on the merits.49 In contrast, circuit courts nationwide
hear oral argument only 29% of the time, deciding more than two-thirds
of their cases based upon the parties’ briefs.50 This may be due to the
fact that “agency reviews are often disproportionately complex, esoteric,
and difficult.”51 On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit’s lower volume of
cases and the fact that all of its judges are located in one courthouse in
Washington, D.C. may explain part of that difference. For example, in
2009, the average active D.C. Circuit judge participated in 168 cases
terminated on the merits, compared to the nationwide average of 495.52
In other words, a typical federal appellate judge may expect to participate
in nearly three times the number of merits cases per year than a judge on
the D.C. Circuit.53 Moreover, the ratio of signed opinions to unsigned
dispositions, such as per curiam judgments, is roughly the same for the
D.C. Circuit as all other circuits.54 Although circuit courts nationwide
issue published opinions in only 15% of cases, the D.C. Circuit issues
published opinions nearly 40% of the time.55 The large numbers of unpublished opinions in the other circuits make up for some of this difference. Although the nationwide average for unpublished opinions is 21%
of dispositions, the D.C. Circuit issues none.56

09.pdf (last visited July 2, 2013) [hereinafter Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary
2009].
49 See infra Figure 2.
50 Id.
51 BAKER, supra note 12, at 85.
52 Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary 2009, supra note 48.
53 These numbers include cases considered by both active resident and visiting judges
terminated on the merits. The numbers exclude resident senior judges, but include visiting
senior judges. However, we expect that the contributions of visiting senior judges do not
significantly affect these numbers because the practice is comparatively rare. In addition,
these calculations are based upon the number of active judges as of January 1, 2011, rather
than the number of authorized judgeships. In other words, these numbers take into account the
seventeen vacancies as of that date. One of those vacancies has since been filled. See Judicial
Vacancies, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacancies
.aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
54 See infra Figure 3.
55 Id.
56 Id.
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DOCKET DRIVERS: “PUSH” AND “PULL” EXPLANATIONS
FOR A UNIQUE CASELOAD

The D.C. Circuit’s docket is a product of three sorts of drivers.
First, geographic and demographic “push” factors cause the D.C. Circuit
to hear fewer cases in some categories than do the other circuits. Second, congressional choice is a “pull” factor that attracts more cases in
some categories to the D.C. Circuit than to the other circuits. Third,
57

Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary 2009, supra note 48.
Table S-3. U.S. Courts of Appeals—Types of Opinions or Orders Filed in Cases Terminated on the Merits After Oral Hearings or Submission on Briefs During the 12-Month
Period Ending September 30, 2009, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/Judicial
Business/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/tables/S03Sep
09.pdf (last visited July 2, 2013).
58
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where litigants have a choice of forum, their choices are a third sort of
driver that, depending upon their perceptions about the desirability of the
trial and appellate level federal courts in the District and any alternatives,
may either push cases away from the D.C. Circuit or pull them in.
A. The “Push”: Fewer Typical Federal Cases
The D.C. Circuit hears fewer commercial and criminal cases than do
other circuit courts. Part of this can be explained through basic geography and demographics. The D.C. Circuit is simply far smaller and has
far fewer people living in it compared to any other circuit. About
600,000 people live within the geographic jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit.59 The Congress has authorized eleven appellate judgeships for the
D.C. Circuit, compared to 167 authorized judgeships for all of the federal
courts of appeal60 serving a national population of over 316 million.61 In
other words, Washington, D.C. has about 1.8 authorized federal circuit
judgeships per 100,000 people, compared to the national average of 0.05
per 100,000 people—a 34-fold difference. Geography tells a similar
story. The District spans about sixty-one square miles, compared to the
over 3.5 million square miles that make up the United States.62 On average there is one authorized Circuit judgeship per five and a half square
miles in the D.C. Circuit, compared to the national average of one judgeship per 21,000 square miles.
With so many judges presiding over so few people across such a
small area, the docket of the D.C. Circuit naturally is different from that
of other circuits.63 For example, the number of criminal cases per judge
is much lower, notwithstanding the high crime rate of the District. As a
result, the Court sees proportionally fewer federal criminal cases. In addition, the government employs nearly one third of all employees in the
District.64 With less private commercial activity in the District than in
the rest of the country proportionally per judge, the Court sees fewer
59 State & County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 27, 2013, 1:52 PM), http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/11000.html.
60 See 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (2011). Note that these data do not include the Federal Circuit.
61 U.S. & World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/main/
www/popclock.html (last visited July 2, 2013).
62 Profile of the People and Land of the United States, NATIONALATLAS.GOV, http://na
tionalatlas.gov/articles/mapping/a_general.html (last modified Jan. 14, 2013).
63 See, e.g., Tracey E. George, From Judge to Justice: Social Background Theory and
the Supreme Court, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1333, 1362 n.103 (2008) (“Personal jurisdiction and
venue essentially dictate the subject matter jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit. . . . [T]he small
geographic size of the District of Columbia means that relatively few organizations and individuals reside there, limiting the district court’s personal jurisdiction as well as its venue.”).
64 District of Columbia Wage and Salary Employment by Industry and Place of Work a/
(In Thousands), DOES.DC.GOV, http://does.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/does/publication/at
tachments/DOES_CESdc_May12.pdf (last visited July 10, 2012).
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ordinary commercial disputes. Because there are no immigration courts
within the District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit hears no immigration
appeals. 65 Finally, a lawsuit challenging the denial of benefits under the
Social Security Act may be brought only in the forum in which the
claimant resides.66 As a result, although Social Security cases may be
brought in the District and be appealed to the D.C. Circuit,67 the District’s relatively low population makes these cases relatively rare in the
D.C. Circuit.
B. The “Pull”: More Administrative Cases
The “push” factors discussed above would tend toward a light
docket if it were not for the types of cases the D.C. Circuit hears in
disproportionately large numbers.68 As then-Senator Barack Obama
explained:
[Under the D.C. Circuit’s] jurisdiction fall laws relating
to all sorts of Federal agencies and regulations. . . . It
has jurisdiction that other appeals courts do not have.
The judges on this court are entrusted with the power to
make decisions affecting the health of the environment,
the amount of money we allow in politics, the right of
workers to bargain for fair wages and find freedom from
discrimination, and the Social Security that our seniors
will receive.69
The D.C. Circuit reviews, as a percentage of its docket, almost twice as
many cases involving administrative law and petitions concerning the
federal government as do the other circuits. Moreover, the share of total
administrative reviews in the country conducted by the D.C. Circuit has
been growing steadily over time, from 28% of the national total in 1986
to 36% in 2010.70
65 John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration
Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions
for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 21 (2005) (“The current venue rule is that [an immigration] petition must be filed in the circuit in which the IJ completed proceedings. As a practical
matter, this means that only the First through the Eleventh Circuits have jurisdiction over
petitions for review, since there are no immigration courts located within the territory of the
District of Columbia Circuit. Before April 1, 1997, a petition could be filed in either the
circuit in which the IJ ‘conducted [proceedings] in whole or in part’ or the circuit in which the
petitioner resided.”).
66 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2011).
67 See Rossello v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
68 Although there are surely judges in other circuits who would say the D.C. Circuit’s
docket is light even with its special jurisdiction, the relative workloads of judges on the various
circuits is beyond the scope of this Article.
69 Obama, supra note 1.
70 Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 3.
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One key reason for the concentration of administrative review in the
D.C. Circuit is the Congress’s choice to grant the D.C. Circuit jurisdiction over certain types of cases. For example, the Appendix71 contains
more than 150 statutory provisions that specifically refer to the D.C. Circuit, with over 130 of these specifically relating to jurisdiction. In addition, over a third of those jurisdictional provisions grant exclusive
jurisdiction to the D.C. Circuit. The provisions that grant exclusive jurisdiction establish appellate review but restrict that review to the D.C. Circuit by using a phrase such as the following:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . the final
order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. There shall be no right of appeal in such proceedings to any other circuit court of appeals.72
In the other provisions, the Congress permits appellate review in any
circuit that is proper, usually the home forum of the petitioner, and also
expressly allows review in the D.C. Circuit even if review there otherwise would be improper. The following example comes from a statute
concerning “court review of orders and rules” for the Securities and Exchange Commission:
A person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission
entered pursuant to this chapter may obtain review of the
order in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which he resides or has his principal place of business, or for the District of Columbia Circuit, by filing in
such court, within sixty days after the entry of the order,
a written petition requesting that the order be modified
or set aside in whole or in part.73
These 130 jurisdictional provisions do not include all of the general provisions establishing appellate review that do not specifically mention the
71 For our data set we compiled all the statutory provisions in the United States Code that
single out the D.C. Circuit for special treatment by searching the text of the U.S. Code in
Westlaw using the search: <te(“court of appeals for the district of columbia”) te(“district of
columbia circuit”)>. We also searched for similar statutory provisions that singled out other
circuits, but found that there are only a few: nineteen in total for the other regional circuits, and
sixty-eight for the Federal Circuit. We then catalogued the following for each provision we
found: (1) U.S. Code Title; (2) whether it grants parallel jurisdiction to the D.C. Circuit, makes
such jurisdiction exclusive, or did something else; (3) subject matter, (4) the officer whose
decisions the provision subjects to review; (5) the nature of the decision that the provision
subjects to review; and (relatedly) (6) whether the decision subject to review is a rulemaking,
licensing decision, imposed a fine or penalty, or related to some other adjudication.
72 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(b)(3) (2011) (statute addressing mandatory detention of terrorism
suspects).
73 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2006).
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D.C. Circuit, such as this one, from a statute concerning administrative
review of pesticides:
In the case of actual controversy as to the validity of any
order issued by the Administrator following a public
hearing, any person who will be adversely affected by
such order and who had been a party to the proceedings
may obtain judicial review by filing in the United States
court of appeals for the circuit wherein such person resides or has a place of business, within 60 days after the
entry of such order, a petition praying that the order be
set aside in whole or in part.74
In those general provisions, a resident or proprietor in the District may
still seek review in the D.C. Circuit, but such provisions are not included
in the statistics presented in this section of the Article. Provisions providing for direct review in the District Court for the District of Columbia,
with appellate review in the D.C. Circuit by operation of the general
appellate jurisdiction statute,75 are not included, either.
Although congressional choice plays a direct role in shifting administrative review from other circuits to the D.C. Circuit, it also plays an
indirect role. Not all agency decisions must be reviewed solely by the
D.C. Circuit and, as a matter of fact, many statutes give a plaintiff the
choice between the D.C. Circuit and another circuit court. In such instances, the Congress has still chosen the D.C. Circuit as a forum for
administrative review, but has also given the ultimate choice to the
litigants.
IV. WHY

AND

WHEN DOES THE CONGRESS “PULL” ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TO THE D.C. CIRCUIT?

The preceding sections demonstrate in detail what most administrative law students, scholars, and practitioners already know: the D.C. Circuit plays a special role in administrative law, as well as in other
important, quintessentially federal subject matter areas like national defense. After digging past this initial clarity, however, meaning is hard to
come by. Why exactly is the D.C. Circuit special? Is the Circuit’s special role the product of place? People? Historical accident? Is there
“nothing inevitable about assigning jurisdiction to review government
decisions to the District of Columbia Circuit,” as Chief Justice Roberts
would have it,76 or does the court’s “location in the nation’s capital and
[ ] dual jurisdiction as both federal and local forum[ ] . . . destine[ ]” it to
74
75
76

7 U.S.C. § 136n(b) (2006).
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
Roberts, supra note 2, at 377.
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“make substantial contributions to American jurisprudence,” as Associate Justice Ginsburg explains?77
These questions are not merely academic. The Congress crafts new
judicial review provisions all the time and, when it does so, it makes
venue decisions that are relevant here: should jurisdiction lie in the D.C.
Circuit and should it be exclusive? As “the choice of forums inevitably
affects the scope of the substantive right to be vindicated,”78 the answers
to these questions matter to plaintiffs, defendants, judges, and sometimes, to the country as a whole.
A comprehensive explanation of when jurisdiction should lie in the
D.C. Circuit is beyond the scope of this Article and no doubt depends, in
large part, upon the unique circumstances of each statute and judicial
review provision. Rather, as a starting point, in the first section that follows we offer some possible hypotheses for why the Congress might
choose to treat the D.C. Circuit differently. In the subsequent section we
review the Congress’s actual decisions to explore our hypotheses.
A. Possible Reasons for Treating the D.C. Circuit Differently
As we discussed, one of the main drivers of the D.C. Circuit’s
unique docket is the prevalence of administrative law cases. The Congress has authorized the D.C. Circuit to review a large number of government actions either exclusively—no other circuit can review the
decision—or at the option of the plaintiff who may opt to file either in
the circuit court in which the decision being reviewed took place or in
the D.C. Circuit.
Why vest such broad jurisdiction in the D.C. Circuit? We can think
of several plausible explanations for the Congress’s decision to concentrate the authority to review agency actions in the D.C. Circuit. We think
it likely that each of these explanations goes some way towards painting
the full picture.
First, the Congress may believe that it is more efficient to have a
single court provide guidance about administrative proceedings. That
way, a federal agency regulating on a national scale need tailor its action
to only one body of precedent, rather than to a patchwork of potentially
conflicting cases in multiple circuits. But although the Congress could
have given the D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over all administrative
law, as it did with the Federal Circuit over patent law,79 it did not go
quite this far.
77
78
79

Bloch & Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 549.
U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 359–60 (1971).
See 28 USC § 1295(a)(1) (2006).
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Second, there may be a positive feedback effect because the D.C.
Circuit is perceived by many in the Congress, as well as perhaps by the
President, the public, and the press, to be the circuit with the greatest
expertise in administrative law. For instance, in a recent confirmation
hearing, Senator Charles Schumer of New York remarked:
[W]e are talking about nothing less momentous than a
lifetime appointment to what is generally regarded as the
second-most important court in the land, a court of great
importance to those of us who sit in the Senate or the
House, because it has such jurisdiction over governmental issues, and years after this nomination, this court is
going to influence a great deal what this Congress and
future Congresses have done.80
The example above is only one of many that demonstrate that senators
perceive a special role for the D.C. Circuit.81
Third, the D.C. Circuit’s expertise may exist not only in the eye of
the congressional beholder. It is reasonable to believe that the Circuit
has a particular expertise in administrative law simply because of the
nature of its docket over the last few decades. In addition, a large percentage of the members of the court have experience in either the executive or the legislative branches, a perspective that undoubtedly helps
inform their decisions addressing the government and its agencies.82
80 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Brett Kavanaugh to be Circuit Judge for
the District of Columbia Circuit: Before the Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States S.,
109th Cong. 3 (2006), available at http://www.coherentbabble.com/Congress/SenHrgJud
Comm050906.pdf.
81 Illinois Senator Dick Durbin also spoke during Judge Kavanaugh’s nomination hearing, noting that the D.C. Circuit is the “second-highest court in the land.” Id. at 26. In addition, Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy acknowledged the D.C. Circuit’s “special
jurisdiction” and the significant role it plays in various legislative areas of national importance,
such as those regarding the National Labor Relations Board, “the relationship of workers and
what happens to workers, discrimination against workers in the workplace,” and environmental issues. Id. at 30. Senator Kennedy also noted that so many of the D.C. Circuit’s judgments
become law that very few are ever heard by the Supreme Court. Id.
82 In 1987, Judge Patricia Wald explained: “[O]ur members include three ex-Senators or
Representatives and seven others who previously held senior executive branch positions. A
stint in one of the other branches seems almost a prerequisite to service on our court.” See
Wald, supra note 2. Since she wrote those words, new additions to the D.C. Circuit have also
brought similar executive or legislative experience. For example, Judge Kavanaugh served as
Senior Associate Counsel to President George W. Bush, Judge Griffith served as Senate Legal
Counsel of the United States, and Judge Garland was Principal Associate Deputy Attorney
General. List of D.C. Circuit Judges and Their Biographies, CADC.USCOURTS.GOV, http://www
.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/Judges (last visited July 2, 2013).
Former D.C. Circuit judge John Roberts was Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and
former judge Clarence Thomas was Chairman of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. See http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx. Other nominees to
the Circuit have also had executive branch experience. Current Justice Elena Kagan was Deputy Assistant to President Clinton for Domestic Policy, and Caitlin Halligan, a recent nominee,
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Fourth, the Congress—or the interest groups influencing the Congress’s choices about jurisdiction—may approve of decisions the D.C.
Circuit reaches or of its administrative law precedent generally. Although it is difficult to determine whether this is the case, the Supreme
Court’s rulings provide one proxy. The Supreme Court is, after all, the
last word on administrative law and the other cases the D.C. Circuit
hears. Over the last five terms, the D.C. Circuit’s Supreme Court batting
average (cases affirmed divided by cases taken by the Supreme Court) is
significantly better than the overall average.83
Fifth, the D.C. Circuit is geographically close to many of the agencies and entities whose decisions it has jurisdiction to review. The Congress likely recognizes that it is significantly more convenient for those
agencies to litigate appeals in a court that is close by. As one former
judge put it, “When individual legislators or the leadership in the two
Houses decide to enter the judicial arena, they find it an easy walk or
subway ride to [the D.C. Circuit] courthouse.”84
Each of these factors may also help to explain why some private
litigants opt for review in the D.C. Circuit when the Congress, through a
statute granting non-exclusive jurisdiction, has given them the option of
doing so. Each litigant’s decision may either push a case away from the
D.C. Circuit or pull one in. Because the D.C. Circuit has greater experience with and may have greater expertise in administrative law, a litigant
who believes he will benefit from that expertise may choose to file in
that Circuit. In contrast, a litigant who feels that the Circuit’s expertise
could hurt him will go elsewhere. In addition to expertise, a litigant is
likely to opt for the D.C. Circuit when he believes that Circuit is more
likely to reverse an agency decision than the other available circuits. The
D.C. Circuit has a higher reversal rate of agency decisions than do the
other circuits,85 and is regarded by some as a “relatively strict overseer of
agencies.” 86 Furthermore, the litigant in a particular case might prefer
the D.C. Circuit’s precedent regarding an issue of administrative or subwas Solicitor General of the State of New York. See id.; Ashley Parker, Republicans Block
Judicial Nominee’s Confirmation for a Second Time, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/us/politics/republicans-again-block-confirmation-of-judicial-nomi
nee-halligan.html.
83 See generally Tom Goldstein, Stat Pack Archive, SCOTUSBLOG.COM, http://www.scotus
blog.com/reference/stat-pack (last visited July 2, 2013) (a compilation of Supreme Court
statistics).
84 Wald, supra note 2, at 2.
85 See Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 4. Of course, the D.C. Circuit’s higher reversal rate
may itself be the result of a sample selection bias. Petitioners with cases worthy of reversal
may flock disproportionately to the D.C. Circuit for some of the other reasons we have
identified.
86 Harold H. Bruff, Coordinating Judicial Review in Administrative Law, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1193, 1202 (1992).
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stantive law. For example, unlike the First and Ninth Circuits, the D.C.
Circuit requires that an agency issue a rule subject to public notice and
comment before changing the way it interprets its own regulation.87
Geography likely also plays a role in litigants’ choice of venue.
Trade associations, consumer organizations, and other groups who are
frequent challengers of agency regulations concentrate in the District of
Columbia.88 The proximity of the headquarters of those groups to the
D.C. Circuit likely makes the Circuit an appealing venue, as does the
expertise in administrative law that local law firms have developed.
It is likely that each of the factors we have identified contributes at
least somewhat to the decision by the Congress to confer on the D.C.
Circuit extensive jurisdiction over administrative review. But can more
be said about why the Congress treats the D.C. Circuit differently than
other circuits?
B. Findings
We reviewed how the Congress has treated the D.C. Circuit in the
past, as reflected in the U.S. Code, in the hopes of revealing trends that
can guide future decision-making and show what the Congress thinks
about the D.C. Circuit’s special role. In short, we set out to discover why
the Congress thinks the D.C. Circuit is special. We also hope this analysis serves as a starting point for developing a broader normative framework for evaluating when the D.C. Circuit should be given jurisdiction
and when that jurisdiction should be exclusive.
Our dataset, which is discussed below, allows us to analyze how the
Congress gives the D.C. Circuit special treatment across three cuts: by
the subject matter over which a statutory provision grants review; by the
nature of the decision it places under review; and by the type of decision
maker whose decision it puts under review.89 Each cut is discussed
below.
87 Compare Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (requiring notice and comment for an FAA Notice to Operators), with Warder v. Shalala, 149
F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that an interpretative rule was not invalidated by the lack of
notice and comment procedures), and Erringer v. Thompson, 371 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that no notice and comment is necessary for an interpretive rule).
88 See MORRIS, supra note 18, at 293–94 (“Because of the location of the agencies and
the new public interest organizations in Washington . . . Congress entrusted the Court with
more exclusive jurisdiction.”); Bruff, supra note 86, at 1202 (“[S]pecialized segments of the
bar that handle administrative litigation, for example communications lawyers, cluster in
Washington.”).
89 Because our dataset focuses upon statutes specifically addressing the D.C. Circuit, it
does not account for the underlying frequency of these categories across the U.S. Code and
federal judiciary.
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1. Special Treatment by Subject Matter
As Table 1 shows, the distribution of references to the D.C. Circuit
in the U.S. Code is not uniform. Specifically, only ten titles have more
than five references: 7 (Agriculture), 8 (Aliens and Nationality), 12
(Banks and Banking), 15 (Commerce and Trade), 21 (Food and Drugs),
26 (Internal Revenue Code), 28 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure), 30
(Mineral Lands and Mining), 42 (The Public Health and Welfare), and
49 (Transportation).
U.S. Code Title

Total references

2

The Congress

1

5

Government Organization and Employees

2

7

Agriculture

11

8

Aliens and Nationality

10

10 Armed Forces

4

12 Banks and Banking

11

15 Commerce and Trade

20

16 Conservation

2

17 Copyrights

3

18 Crimes and Criminal Procedure

1

19 Custom Duties

1

20 Education

2

21 Food and Drugs
22 Foreign Relations and Intercourse

15
4

25 Indians

2

26 Internal Revenue Code

5

27 Intoxicating Liquors

1

28 Judiciary and Judicial Procedure

5

29 Labor

3

30 Mineral Lands and Mining

5

33 Navigation and Navigable Waters

4

38 Veterans’ Benefits

1

39 Postal Service

1

40 Public Buildings, Property, and Works

1

42 The Public Health and Welfare
43 Public Lands

12
1

45 Railroads

2

47 Telegraphs, Telephones, and Radiotelegraphs

2

49 Transportation

12

50 War and National Defense

1

TABLE 1: REFERENCES TO THE D.C. CIRCUIT
IN THE U.S. CODE BY TITLE90
90 Note that five additional references are contained in public laws not yet codified into
the U.S. Code.
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The distribution of exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdictional provisions also is not uniform. Table 2 shows the four titles that have more
than five jurisdictional provisions, of which at least fifty percent are exclusive. They include Titles 8 (Aliens and Nationality, 100 percent), 22
(Foreign Relations and Intercourse, fifty percent), 26 (Internal Revenue
Code, sixty percent), and 42 (The Public Health and Welfare, seventythree percent). Similarly, Table 3 shows the major non-exclusive titles,
defined as having more than five jurisdictional provisions, of which less
than fifty percent are exclusive. Only seven titles fit this definition and
three have no exclusive provisions.
Exclusive
Jurisdiction

U.S. Code Title
8
22
26
42

Aliens and Nationality
Foreign Relations and Intercourse
Internal Revenue Code
The Public Health and Welfare

TABLE 2: MAJOR TITLES

WITH

100%
50%
60%
73%

EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

U.S. Code Title
7
12
15
21
30
33
49

Agriculture
Banks and Banking
Commerce and Trade
Food and Drugs
Mineral Lands and Mining
Navigation and Navigable Waters
Transportation

TABLE 3: MAJOR TITLES

WITH

Exclusive
Jurisdiction
9%
27%
15%
0%
40%
0%
0%

NON-EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

2. Special Treatment by Type of Agency Action
Another way to examine the special treatment the D.C. Circuit receives from the Congress is to consider what type of action each special
review provision concerns. The jurisdictional provisions include reviews
of two licensing provisions, thirty-five provisions for fines or penalties,
twenty-four rulemaking provisions, and seventy-six other adjudications.91 Notably, only three, or 9%, of the thirty-five provisions involv91

Note that some provisions involve the review of more than one type of action.
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ing fines or penalties give the D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction, while
46% of the rulemaking provisions give the Circuit exclusive review.
Three considerations might explain the significantly greater likelihood that the Congress will make the D.C. Circuit’s jurisdiction over a
rulemaking decision, as opposed to a fine or penalty decision, exclusive.
First, a regulation is more likely to have a national effect than a fine or
penalty, which may have no national effect beyond its potential to act as
persuasive precedent. Second, the Congress may believe that the presumption that a plaintiff should be able to choose his forum is stronger in
the context of a challenge to a penalty or fine, where a particular plaintiff
has been subjected to direct agency action, than in the context of a regulation, which usually is a statement of general applicability with future
effect.92 Third, most federal agencies are headquartered in the District or
nearby, so it is reasonable to assume that the personnel and materials
relevant to a rulemaking are located there as well.
3. Special Treatment by the Decision Maker
Our dataset also allows us to compare the Congress’s special treatment of the D.C. Circuit based upon the placement of the decision maker
in the constitutional structure. The majority of U.S. Code provisions providing for exclusive jurisdiction in the D.C. Circuit govern review of
quasi-judicial decisions, such as those of the Copyright Royalty judges,93
certain military commissions,94 and, in certain situations, the Tax
Court.95
As for administrative agencies, in our dataset the D.C. Circuit’s jurisdiction to review the decision of an independent agency is almost
twice as likely to be exclusive (29% of review provisions) than is its
jurisdiction to review the decision of an agency whose head is subject to
the President’s removal (16% of review provisions). There are two theoretical explanations for this trend, but we can only speculate about what
the Congress really has in mind.
First, for better or worse, independent agencies are insulated from
political influence, making the judiciary a relatively more important
check upon their decision-making. The Congress may leave judicial review in the exclusive hands of the D.C. Circuit in hopes that a single
court articulating a single body of law will be able to maintain a closer
watch over the actions of a particular agency than can thirteen circuits.
Second, the insulation afforded independent agencies often is intended to allow them to make decisions based upon expertise in compli92
93
94
95

See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2006).
17 U.S.C. § 803(d)(1) (2006).
10 U.S.C. § 950g(a) (2006).
26 U.S.C. § 7482(b)(1) (2006).
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cated regulatory areas. The Congress may leave judicial review of such
decisions in the exclusive hands of the D.C. Circuit upon the assumption
that, for all the reasons discussed above, the Circuit is in the best position
to consider complicated administrative decisions while paying due deference to the acting agency’s expertise.
CONCLUSION
From its initial formation, the D.C. Circuit has heard different types
of cases than the other federal courts of appeal. The modern D.C. Circuit
hears a disproportionate share of administrative petitions and other cases
involving the federal government because of a number of factors. Notably, the Congress has expressly given the D.C. Circuit jurisdiction over
many types of administrative issues. In particular, the D.C. Circuit tends
to have exclusive jurisdiction over review of rules promulgated by federal administrative agencies and, specifically, independent agencies.
There are many possible explanations for the differences, including accidents of history and geography and congressional preferences for a court
with expertise in administrative law.
Opportunities for further investigation regarding the D.C. Circuit
abound. First, research is needed to put flesh on the statutory bones we
have identified and to supplement our analysis. Which specific kinds of
administrative cases comprise the D.C. Circuit docket? In other words,
does the D.C. Circuit’s docket substantially reflect cases over which the
Congress gave it exclusive jurisdiction, or does the Circuit’s administrative diet consist largely of cases that could have been brought anywhere
but were brought to the District at the choice of private litigants? Other
questions include, for example, whether the Congress has consistently
created statutes granting exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction to the
D.C. Circuit, or whether those special grants have arisen episodically
across the nation’s history depending upon the political or social forces
of the day?
Furthermore, while our analysis takes into account only statutes that
specifically mention the D.C. Circuit, statutes that specifically grant jurisdiction in federal district court in the District of Columbia also channel
review through the D.C. Circuit. Additional research could supplement
our analysis to account for these types of cases and explore the Congress’s choice in vesting initial jurisdiction over agency action in either a
district court or in a court of appeals.
Second, more research is needed to explore the consequences of the
D.C. Circuit’s unique jurisdiction and caseload. Although the Federal
Circuit also enjoys a unique docket, commentators have given the conse-
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quences of that court’s jurisdiction decidedly mixed reviews.96 Although
a specialized court could lead to more consistent results, it could also
lead to institutional tunnel vision caused by a lack of the collective wisdom of many different courts addressing similar questions somewhat independently, as is typically the case in federal courts. It would be hard to
evaluate empirically the success of the areas over which the D.C. Circuit
has exclusive jurisdiction, but the areas of nonexclusive jurisdiction
leave room for exploration. For example, we have not ventured to quantify whether other circuits tend to agree with the D.C. Circuit’s administrative decisions, how often litigants choose to file in the D.C. Circuit
when given a choice, or whether part of a litigant’s decision to file in the
D.C. Circuit is because of petitioner-favorable precedent. Nor have we
assessed the normative implications of a specialized court.

96 See generally, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The
Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787 (2008).
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7 U.S.C. § 2714(b)(2)
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§ 687e(f)(4)(B)
§ 717r(b)
§ 719h(c)(1)
§ 720e(a), (c)
§ 766(c)
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§ 2060(a)
§ 2615(a)(3)
§ 2618(a)(1)(A)
§ 3416(a)(4)
§ 6714(a)
§ 4016(b)(2)(A)
§ 825l(b)
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§ 335c(d)
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26 U.S.C. § 7482(b)(3)
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39 U.S.C. § 3663
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48 U.S.C. § 1613
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48 U.S.C. § 1823(c)
49 U.S.C. § 521(b)(9)
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49 U.S.C. § 31141(f)
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49 U.S.C. § 32909(a)
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49 U.S.C. § 46110(a)
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49 U.S.C. § 47129(c)(5)
49 U.S.C. § 60119(a)
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